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.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNNERSITY OF 
ALABAMA V. GARRETT AND THE EQUAL EDUCATION 
OPPORTUNITY ACT: ANOTHER ACT BITES THE DUST 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Board of Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Garrett not only expanded state 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment but it also created 
new implications for Congressional acts based on Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. In its 5-4 holding in Garrett, the Court spe-
cifically overturned Congress's abrogation of state immunity 
within the American with Disabilities Act, stating several in-
sufficiencies in Congress's reasoning. 1 This decision could af-
fect many private rights of action against states, not only under 
the ADA, but also under other congressional acts based on sec-
tion five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 
This case note will focus on the Supreme Court's analysis in 
Garrett and discuss this decision's implications for the Equal 
Education Opportunity Act. More specifically, section two will 
discuss the Equal Education Opportunity Act (EEOA). Section 
three will outline the legislative and judicial history of the 
Eleventh Amendment, including recent Supreme Court deci-
sions leading up to Garrett. Section four will discuss the Su-
preme Courts analysis of Garrett. Section five will apply the 
Garrett analysis to the EEOA. Section six will be the conclu-
sion. 
II. THE EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY ACT 
The Equal Education Opportunity Act is based on legal 
principles found in the Bilingual Education Act of 1964 and the 
1. Ed. of Trustees of the U. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §5 (Section five is the Enforcement Clause; it reads, 
"The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article."), see Erwin Chemerinsky, Forecasting the Future o{Federalism, 37 
Trial18, 22 (2001). 
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Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols. Congress passed 
the Bilingual Education Ace in order to provide federal funds 
to develop bilingual education programs. The act did not man-
date that schools adopt bilingual education programs. The act 
also provided extensive discretion as to how local authorities 
ran these programs. 4 In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court 
held that the San Francisco school system's failure to provide 
special language education to non-English speaking Chinese 
students violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Title 
VI thus requires that school districts provide special language 
education to non-English speaking students who would other-
wise be excluded from public education because of their inabil-
ity to speak English.6 
Responding to the Lau decision, Congress passed the EEOA 
in 1974. The EEOA provides that "no state shall deny equal 
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or 
her race, color, sex, or national origin by ... the failure by an 
educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome lan-
guage barriers that impede equal participation by its students 
in its instructional programs."7 By requiring schools to take 
"appropriate action to overcome language barriers,"8 the EEOA 
does little more than codify the Lau decision. 9 
A fundamental problem with the EEOA is that neither the 
Lau decision nor the EEOA prescribe any particular education 
program for schools to use. School districts still possess wide 
discretion to create and operate bilingual education programs. 
The various results of this wide discretion are the primary 
source of litigation under the EEOA. Additional cases, 
primarily Castaneda v. Pickard, provide state and local educa-
tion authorities wide latitude to decide actions they will take to 
:3. 20 U.S.C. §§ :3221-61 (1988) (Now found in20 U.S.C. §7401 (1994).). 
4. See Nirej Sekhon, Birthright Rearliculated: The Politics of Bilingual Educa-
tion, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1407 (1999). 
5. [,au v. Nichols, 411 U.S. 56:3 (1971); see also Scott Ellis Ferrin, Reasserting 
/,anguage Rights of Native American Students in the Face of Proposition 227 and Other 
Language-Based Referenda, 28 J.L. & Educ. 1, 9 (HJ99). 
6. See Luis Rodriguez, Discretion. and Destruction, 4 Tex. Forum on Civ. Liber-
ties & Civ. Rig-hts 189, 207 (1999). 
7. 20 U.S.C. 9 110:1 (1971); Ronald D Wenkart, The Rattle Over Bilingual Edu-
cation in CalifornicL, 123 Ed. L. f{ep. 4G!J, ;!()2 (1991>). 
8. 20 U.S.C. § 170:1. 
9. i{odrif.,'l.JeZ, supra n. fi, at 200. 
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l b . 10 overcome anguage arners. 
In Castaneda, rather than requiring that local officials take 
specific action to address the needs of students who were Eng-
lish deficient, the U.S. Court of Appeals instead held that the 
EEOA required only appropriate action. In other words, local 
education officials are not required to offer any specific bilin-
gual education program. 11 The court established a three-prong 
test for determining the appropriateness of the language reme-
diation: 
First, the court must examine carefully the evidence the re-
cord contains concerning the soundness of the educational 
theory or principles upon which the challenged program is 
based .... The court's second inquiry would be whether the 
programs and practices actually used by a school system are 
reasonably calculated to implement effectively the educa-
tional theory adopted by the school. . . . Finally, . . . [i]f a 
school's program, although premised on a legitimate educa-
tional theory and implemented through the use of adequate 
techniques fails, after being employed for a period of time suf-
ficient to give the plan a legitimate trial, to produce results 
indicating that the language barriers confronting students are 
actually being overcome, that program may, at that point, no 
longer constitute appropriate action as far as that school is 
concerned. 12 
The EEOA, initially thought ineffective, is now the law of 
choice for bilingual education litigation. Bilingual education 
litigation recently garnered national attention when California 
passed Proposition 227. 1:1 Proposition 227 is a perfect example 
of a state using the broad latitude granted to it by the EEOA to 
create a program to deal with English-deficient students. Cali-
fornia mandated intensive English instruction for Limited Eng-
lish Proficient (LEP) students. Proposition 227 also prohibited 
any program designed to sustain a teaching program in alan-
guage other than English. 14 The controversial issue of Proposi-
tion 227 was whether requiring LEP students to learn English 
rather than allowing students to learn in their native language 
10. Castaneda ex rel. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); see also 
Keyes u. f:>ch. Dist. No.1, 57G 1<'. Supp. 150:l (D. Colo. 1983); see generally, Ferrin, supra 
n. 5, at J l-12. 
II. Wenkart, supra n. 7 at 4G3. 
12. Castaneda, G48 1<'.2d at 1009-1010. 
1:l. Rodrigum1, supra n. Gat 207; Wcnkart, supra n. 7 at 465, 468. 
11\. Ferrin, supra n. 5, at 7. 
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was in accordance with the EEOA. The EEOA '; .. looks only at 
whether a program has the effect of excludmg NJ?P [Non-
English Speakers] and LEP student~ fr?m_ the ed~catwn~1 pro-
gram and does not require proof of d1scn~mator~ m~ent. 
The EEOA's appropriate action reqmrement IS hkely broad 
enough to include English as a second language_ (ESL) pro-
grams or structured immersion programs much hke the pro-
grams being established in California. 16 Given that proponents 
of legislation such as Proposition 227 are now focusing on fed-
eral legislation, the issue of bilingual education will likely be 
the source of continued litigation. As a result, the EEOA will be 
17 
at the forefront of the legal battles. 
Congress specifically created a private right of action under 
the EEOA. Section §1706 of the EEOA provides that "an indi-
vidual denied an equal educational opportunity, as defined by 
this subchapter may institute a civil action in an appropriate 
district court of the United States against such parties, and for 
such relief, as may be appropriate."18 Yet, the language of the 
EEOA is void of any specific abrogation of state immunity un-
der the Eleventh Amendment. One possible reason that the 
EEOA lacks a specific abrogation clause is that school districts 
are not necessarily protected by sovereign immunity. Rather, 
sovereign immunity is only granted to states and does not pro-
tect municipal corporations, counties, and school boards. 19 
However, when a bilingual education proposal becomes a state-
wide law, like California's Proposition 227, state sovereign im-
munity will likely be a factor in any litigation under that law. 20 
The EEOA is a prime candidate to be scrutinized under the 
15. Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 
321, 331 (1987). 
16. !d. 
17. Ferrin, supra n. 5, at 7. 
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1706 (West 1999). 
19. See Ronald D. Rottmda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: 
Substance and Procedure vol. l, §12.2, 156 (3d ed., West 1999). 
20. See Ferrin, supra n. 5, at 11; John W. Borkowski, Alexander E. Dreier & 
Maya R. Kobersy, The 2000-2001 Term of the United States Supreme Court and Its Im-
pact on Public Schools, 156 Educ. L. Rep 381, 394. [n other words, if school districts or 
school boards create their own language programs independently, then they will not be 
protected by the Eleventh Amendment. If, however, a state law dictates how all schools 
are to handle bilingual language programs, it stands to reason that suits brought 
against the state based on this state law could call upon their Eleventh Amendment 
Immunity. Moreover, state law may recognize districts as arms of the state govern-
ment. As a result, a district would enjoy state sovereign immtmity. 
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Garrett analysis because the EEOA not only creates a private 
right of action for citizens but also implies that the action can 
only be against a state. 
III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Eleventh Amendment's Historical Background 
Congress and the states adopted the Eleventh Amendment 
in response to the 1793 Supreme Court decision in Chislom v. 
Georgia. 21 Chislom was a suit brought by two South Carolini-
ans working for a British creditor. The plaintiffs attempted to 
recover bonds that the State of Georgia had confiscated. The 
Supreme Court held that Georgia was liable to private actions 
against it even though the State had not waived its sovereign 
immunity. This holding prompted Congress and the states to 
22 pass the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment 
reads, "The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of an-
other State, or by citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."23 
The amendment's authors only granted immunity to states 
being sued by citizens of another state, demonstrating that the 
amendment was written specifically for the facts in Chislom. 24 
The Congress and state legislatures ratified the Eleventh 
Amendment within five years with little debate. 25 Because the 
Eleventh Amendment passed so quickly, its legislative history 
is relatively sparse, leaving the amendment open to interpreta-
tion and controversy. 26 This lack of legislative history and 
guidance lead to decisions like New Hampshire v. Louisiana, in 
which the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment 
also bars private actions by citizens against their own state. 
The Court in New Hampshire stated that the meaning of the 
Amendment is not limited to the plain meaning of the actual 
21. 2 U.S. ~ 19 (1793). See Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, J. M. Balkin & Akhil 
Reed Amar, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 71-72 (~th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 
2000). 
22. Brest, supra n. 21, at 72. 
2:l. U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
2~. Brest, supra n.21, at 72 n.3. 
25. See l{otmula, su.pra n. 19, at 151. 
2(). /d. at 152. 
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text. Instead, the authors of the Amendment intended that 
states should never be brought to court by private citizens 
against their will. 27 
Despite the Eleventh Amendment, states can still be sued 
by private citizens in one of two ways. First, a state can consent 
to be sued by a private party by waiving its immunity.28 Sec-
ond, Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under congressional powers found in the Constitu-
tion. The Rehnquist Court has recently limited the powers 
Congress may rely on to abrogate state immunity to §5 of the 
29 Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. Contemporary Eleventh Amendment Case Law 
"In the past ten years, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has begun a systematic reappraisal of doctrines concern-
ing federalism, racial equality, and civil rights that, if success-
ful, will redraw the constitutional map as we know it."30 In 
1990, Congress enjoyed seemingly limitless power to subject 
the states to its social and economic policy under the combined 
authority of the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Over the past decade the Supreme 
Court has whittled away at Congress's longstanding power 
over the states by renewing the states' authority and autonomy 
and by restricting national authority over the states, culminat-
ing in the Garrett decision; the Supreme Court's latest blow to 
federal authority over states. 31 
As recently as 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authorit/2, the Supreme Court rejected "as unsound in 
27. N.H. v. La. 108 U.S. 76 (188:1); Brest, supra n. 21, at 72 n. 3. 
28. Rottmda, supra n. 19, at 164. 
29. ld, see Seminole Tribe v. Fla. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (The Court held that Con-
gress cannot constitutionally use the Commerce Clause to create a private right of ac-
tion against non-consenting states. One reason is that the Eleventh Amendment fol-
lowed the Commerce Clause and, therefore, could not be altered by an earlier section. 
Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment came after the Eleventh :'lnd can bind the Elev-
enth Amendment). 
:10. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Reuo· 
lution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1052-1053 (2001). 
31. James Leonard, The Shadows ol Unconstitutionality: How the New Federal-
ism. May allect the Anti- Discrimination Mandate olthe Americans with Disabilities Act 
52 Ala. L. Rev. 91, 92-93 (2000). 
:32. 46~ U.S. 528 ( 1985) (Metropolitan Transit Authority brought action seeking 
declaratory JUdgment that it was entitled to Tenth Amendment immtmity from mini-
mum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Fair L3bor Standards Act. On appeal, 
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principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity 
from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of 
whether a ,particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'tra-
ditional'."~" Justice Blackmun's opinion was short-lived, how-
ever, as the Rehnquist Court would mark the beginning of its 
constitutional revolution with the 1991 decision in Gregory v. 
34 Ashcroft.· 
Writing for majority in Gregory, Justice O'Connor rejected 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) as it ap-
plied to the Missouri State Constitution, which set mandatory 
retirement ages for judges.35 By advocating the importance of 
independent state sovereignty and by requiring Congress to 
use unmistakably clear language when it intends to infringe on 
a state's core functions, Justice O'Connor set the tone for the 
Court's subsequent state's rights decisions. 36 
The Supreme Court followed its decision in Gregory with 
several key constitutional decisions that expanded the bounds 
of state sovereignty. For example, the next year in New York v. 
United States, the Court held that the Congress lacked the con-
stitutional power to command the states to legislate. 37 Follow-
ing New York, the Court in United States v. Lopez invalidated 
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, thus limiting congres-
sional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. 38 Then, 
in 1996, the Court decided Seminole Tribe v. Florida. In Semi-
nole Tribe the Court invalidated Congress's direct abrogation of 
Florida's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity under the 
the Supreme Court, ,Justice Blackmun, held that transit authority was not immune 
from minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Act, essentially overruling Na-
tional League o{Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).). 
33. ld. at 546. 
:34. 501 U.S. 452 (199]). 
;{5. /d. at 473 
;{6. ld. at 460. 
:n. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act of 1985, which, among other things, required New York to take title 
of radioactive waste and assume the liability of the waste. New York ~ned, claiming the 
act violated the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme 
Court declared the Act unconstitutional in part, holding that the take title clause ex-
ceeded thf~ Tenth Amendment.). 
38. 514 U.S. 549 (19!!5) (Lopez was convicted of violating the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act of H)!J() after carrying a concealed handgun to schooL On appeal, the court 
held the Gtm-Free School Zones Act was beyond the power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause.). 
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Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 39 Mter Seminole Tribe, Con-
gress could not abrogate state immunity unless the act for 
which Congress sought abrofoation derived its basis from §5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
All of these decisions led to the City of Beorne v. Flores deci-
sion and its progeny, the cases which most influenced Garrett. 41 
In Flores, the Court further constrained Congress's power to 
enact legislation under §5. The Court did this by restricting 
Congress's power to pass acts only for the purpose of remedying 
violations of constitutional rights as the Court interpreted 
them. Flores gave the Court substantial reviewing power over 
congressional acts that dealt with constitutional rights. 42 More-
over, the remedy that Congress desired to enforce had to be 
proportional and congruent to the scope and frequency of the 
violations. 43 Therefore, Congress was not only limited in its §5 
powers to creating legislation that did not infringe on Eleventh 
Amendment state immunity, but that legislation was also re-
stricted by intense judicial scrutiny of its appropriateness to 
d h . l . 44 reme y t e vw atwn. 
IV. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNNERSITY OF ALABAMA V. 
GARRETT 
The Garrett decision is important because, for the first 
time, the court based its holding on the frailty of the legislative 
materials alone, signaling a break from the Court's tradition of 
deference to Congress as the fact finder. 45 
;)9. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (The Seminole tribe sued the state of Florida and its gov-
ernor, alleging that the State had refi.tsed to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of 
gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, thereby violating Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act. The State moved to dismiss, citing its sovereign immtmity under the Eleventh 
Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, holding 
that the State did have immunity under the I<:leventh Amendment. The United States 
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibited Congress from making states liable for private actions.). 
40. William E. Thro, The Eleventh Amendment Revolution in the Lower Federal 
Courts 25 .J.C. & U.L. 501, 503 (1999). 
41. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
42. Balkin, supra n. 30, at 1054-55. 
43. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520. 
44. Balkin, supra n. ;~o, at 1055. 
45. William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Shapiro, Lef{islative Record Review 54 Stan. 
L. Rev. 87 (2001). 
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A. Facts and Procedural History 
In Garrett, the first respondent, Patricia Garrett, was a reg-
istered nurse employed by the University of Alabama in Bir-
mingham hospital. In 1994, Garrett was diagnosed with breast 
cancer and underwent a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and 
chemotherapy, which required her to take substantial time off 
of work. When Garrett returned to work in 1995, Garrett's su-
pervisor informed her that she would have to give up her posi-
tion as a director. Garrett transferred to another lower paying 
position. 
The second respondent, Milton Ash, worked as a security of-
ficer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. Mter be-
ginning his job, Ash informed the Department that he was suf-
fering from chronic asthma and that his doctor recommended 
that he avoid cigarette smoke and carbon dioxide. Ash asked 
that his duties be modified to minimize his exposure to these 
substances. Ash was later diagnosed with sleep apnea. On the 
advice of his doctor, Ash asked the Department to further mod-
ify his duties to accommodate his new condition. Despite Ash's 
requests, the Department refused to make any new changes to 
accommodate Ash's needs. Ash then filed a claim with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Mter filing Ash 
saw a drop in his performance evaluation scores. 46 
Garrett and Ash filed separate lawsuits in district court 
seeking money damages from the State of Alabama under the 
ADA. Both defendants moved for summary judgment, citing 
their Eleventh Amendment immunity. The district court 
granted summary judgment for both cases. These cases were 
consolidated on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, and the court of 
appeals reversed the district court decision, holding that the 
ADA validly abrogates the State's Eleventh Amendment im-
munity.47 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
B. The Garrett Court's Analysis 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five justice major-
ity, reversed the circuit court by barring the respondent's ac-
tion against the state under the Eleventh Amendment. Justice 
Rehnquist cited four reasons for barring the plaintiffs' actions: 
46. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362. 
47. Td. 
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(1) as long as the state's actions are rational, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require states to make special accommo-
dations for the disabled; (2) Congress failed to identify a pat-
tern of irrational state employment discrimination and, conse-
quently, failed to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity; (3) Congress's §5 enforcement authority under the 
Fourteenth Amendment can only be exercised for state trans-
gressions, not for violations by local government units; and (4) 
the ADA does not pass the congruence and proportionality 
test. 48 
Under the first reason, the Court admits that Congress can 
abrogate state immunity if it does so pursuant to a proper ex-
ercise of its §5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, but, 
Congress's action must be limited to remedies for violations of 
§1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.49 
The Court must determine whether the state had demon-
strated a pattern of irrational behavior towards the disabled. "0 
In this case, the Court found that the state's actions against 
the disabled were rational.s1 For example, Justice Rehnquist 
stated, " ... it would be entirely rational (and therefore consti-
tutional) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial re-
sources b¥ hiring employees who are able to use existing facili-
ties ... _,s The majority found that the legislative record for the 
ADA, though replete with many instances of discrimination, 
lacked the necessary evidence to support a pattern of state dis-
criminatory actions against the disabled. 53 In essence, the 
Court stated that although the record contained some instances 
of state discrimination, the states' actions were neither irra-
tional nor common enough to establish a pattern, making the 
states' duty to accommodate under the ADA greater that which 
is constitutionally required. 54 
Additionally, in response to the respondent's claim that the 
48. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356. 
19. !d. at 368. 
50. !d. 
51. !d. at 369. 
52. ld at :l70 (,Justice Rehnquist states that although a single incident of dis-
crimination by a state may be lmconstitutional, all of the incidents takPn together fall 
short of suggesting a pattern of tmconstitutionality.). 
53. ld. at 965; ("While cases since Hl!J5 had f(>cused on the evidence bef(Jre con-
gress, in Garrett the Court for the first time based its ruling solely on the perceived in-
adequacy of complied legislative materials."). Buzbee, supra n. 4 7, at 87, 8!J. 
54. Garrett, 531 lJ .S. at :J7o. 
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Fourteenth Amendment not only governs states but also local 
units of governments, the Court held that it would not extend 
its inquiry to local units of government as the Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply to them. 5" Again, the court used the 
inadequacy of the legislative record to justify its holding. 56 
In review, the cases leading up to Garrett restricted con-
gressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity to leg-
islation enacted under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
Garrett, the court went to the legislative record to determine 
whether Congress was remedying a constitutional violation or 
enacting legislation beyond the scope of its §5 power. 57 If the 
remedies were beyond the scope of substantive guarantees of 
§1, then the remedy had to be proportionate and congruent to 
specific documented violations of the constitution. 58 The Court 
found that the legislative record for the ADA lacked sufficient 
specific instances to demonstrate that states were violating the 
constitutional rights of disabled persons. 59 
V. THE EEOA AND THE GARRETT SCRUTINY 
A Specific Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
Because the EEOA lacks language that specifically abro-
gates state immunity, the EEOA will likely fail to meet there-
quirements for congressional abrogation of state immunity out-
lined in Garrett. Since Seminole Tribe and Garrett, any 
Congressional act that purports to abrogate a state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity must contain an unequivocal expression 
of Congress's intent to abrogate. 6° For example, the ADA's ab-
rogation section states, "A state shall not be immune under the 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent juris-
55. !d. at :>66, n. 1. 
5(). /d. 
57. Cht,meri.nsky, supra n. 2, at 22. 
5!3. Thro, supm n. 4 1, at 50:{-04. 
59. Buzbee, supra. n. 47, at 118. In cases leading up to Garrett, the courts' rigor-
ous scrutiny was f(Jcust~d on the lack of legislative findings. In Garrett, the legislative 
record had ample evidence of discrimination, so the courts' scrutiny of the legislative 
facts marks a sharp departure from the courts' precedents. 
60. Diane !lt~ckman, Title IX Tapestry: Threshold and Procedural Issues, 153 
Educ. L. Rep. 849, l-l5G (200 1). 
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diction for a violation of this chapter."61 The reason for this 
element is that congressional abrogation of state immunity is 
an extraordinary event under current Supreme Court doctrine; 
therefore, Congress must be clear and specific. The Court in 
Garrett was satisfied with Congress's intent to abrogate state 
immunity, so, alternatively, it took issue with whether Con-
gress had acted constitutionally under its §5 powers.62 
In contrast to the language of the ADA, § 1706 of the EEOA 
maintains that "an individual denied an equal educational op-
portunity, as defined by this subchapter may institute a civil 
action in an appropriate district court of the United States 
against such parties, and for such relief, as may be appropri-
ate."6" The authorization for federal suits makes no mention of 
suits against the state. The analysis of whether Congress ar-
ticulated an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity is 
objective, and does not rely on congressional intent. 64 There-
fore, without an express declaration of congressional intent, the 
Court will not infer that Congress meant to abrogate state im-
munity. 
Even if Congress had specifically abrogated the state's im-
munity, that abrogation must be a proper exercise of its §5 
powers.65 Thus the Court must investigate the reasons Con-
gress passed the EEOA. First, Congress must state that it is 
acting under its §5 powers.66 The EEOA, in §1702 (b), states, 
for the forgoing reasons, it is necessary and proper that the 
Congress, pursuant to the powers granted to it by the 
Constitution of the United States, specifY appropriate 
remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school 
systems, except that the provision of this chapter are not 
intended to modifY or diminish the authority of the courts of 
the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States. 67 
Although the EEOA only makes reference to congressional 
powers in the Constitution, it seems unlikely that the Court 
would determine that the EEOA is based on anything but the 
61. 42 U.S.C. §12202. 
62. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-64. 
63. 20 U.S.C.A § 1706. 
64. Moore's Federal Practice§ 12:1.42 [l][b)[ii]. 
65. Garrett, 5:H U.S. at :{64. 
66. Thro, supra n. 42, at 511-12. 
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b). 
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Fourteenth Amendment. Under these circumstances the Court 
will likely base its analysis on whether the statute goes beyond 
68 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The remedy mandated by the 
EEOA is to "take appropriate action to overcome language bar-
riers that impede equal participation by its students in its in-
. 1 ,69 structwna programs. 
One concern the Court will likely have with the EEOA is 
that it does not re~uire proof of discriminatory intent to dem-
onstrate violations. 0 If the remedies under the EEOA do not 
require discriminatory intent, (the act itself is based on there-
strictions of educational privileges based on race, sex, color, or 
national origin), violations of the act without the intent to dis-
criminate do not violate any equal protection Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. The Court will therefore not likely find 
that Congress can sustain the act as a valid exercise of its §5 
powers if it is only trying to remedy poor education rather than 
equal protection. Congressional attempts to go beyond the 
scope of §5 will be subject to the 'proportionality and congru-
71 
ence' test. 
Furthermore, because the federal Constitution does not 
guarantee any right to public education, any attempt to use a 
due process rationale when making an argument under the 
EEOA will be difficult. However, when states mandate public 
education for all children, current law holds that that mandate 
creates a property right for the citizens of that state. The Court 
has held this interest in guaranteed education is a property in-
terest that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.72 That 
being the case, depending on the state constitution, one could 
argue that a state law that does not take 'appropriate action to 
overcome language barriers' deprives students of property 
without due process oflaw. However, because the Garrett court 
also demonstrated an affinity for protecting the states' broad 
discretionary power, even this argument may not be sufficient 
to sustain the EEOC. 
6H. Thro, supra n. 41 at 519. 
6~J. 20 U .S.C. § 1703(1). 
70. Momn, supra n. 15, at 331; see also .Tulie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of 
School Finance and Resource Comparability Litigation, 36 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. 
L. Rev. 527, 550 (2001). 
71. Thro, supra n. 42, at 50:1-04. 
72. Ooss v. J.opez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
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B. Standard of Review 
If the EEOA were to overcome the hurdles of sufficient con-
gressional abrogation and constitutional validity, it would then 
be subject to equal protection analysis. Equal protection analy-
sis is a "three-tiered system of scrutiny by which the federal 
courts examine classifications made by state actors in light of 
the interests affected."73 This three-tiered system corresponds 
with three types of groups affected by state classifications: sus-
. d t 74 pect groups, quasi-suspect groups, an non-suspec groups. 
Under an equal protection analysis the Court would not use a 
rational-basis review, as it did in Garrett, because the EEOA 
addresses constitutional violations of a suspect group. 75 
Suspect groups are classified based on race, ethnicity, sex, 
or a fundamental right such as free speech. When a state's ac-
tion toward a suspect group is involved, the standard of review 
that a defendant state must meet is the strict scrutiny test. 
Under strict scrutiny review a defendant state must show that 
it had a compelling interest to justify the actions in question, 
and that its actions were narrowly tailored to its compelling in-
terest. 
Intermediate scrutiny, sometimes referred to as heightened 
scrutiny, is used when the court is dealing with a quasi-suspect 
class. For example, gender issues will trigger intermediate 
scrutiny. This level of scrutiny requires the defendant state 
show that its classification was substantially related to an im-
portant state interest. 76 
In contrast, the Garrett court was dealing with a non-
suspect class. 77 The Court uses a rational basis review when 
dealing with a non-suspect class. Therefore, it applied a ra-
tional-basis standard, which places the burden on the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that the challenged measure bears no rational 
relationship to a legitimate state goal. 78 
Because the EEOA protects suspect groups, the state must 
demonstrate in an action under the EEOA that it had a com-
73. Leonard, supra n. 31, at 100. 
74. !d. 
75. See 20 ll.S.C. § 1701(1) (date needed) ("All children enrolled in public schools 
are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, st~X, or na-
tional origin."). 
76. !d. at 100-0l. 
77. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-67. 
78. Leonard, supra n. 31, at 10!. 
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pelling reason to make its classification. However, coupled with 
the Court's strict scrutiny is the state's higher level of discre-
tion under the EEOA. Although the defendant state must dem-
onstrate a compelling reason for its action, the EEOA simulta-
neously gives the states wide latitude in choosing actions when 
dealing with educational problems. 79 Under the Garrett analy-
sis, the court is likely to defer to the state's discretion even 
though the state must simultaneously demonstrate a compel-
ling interest that supports its actions. 80 Unlike Garrett, where 
the court looked for patterns of sustained irrational state dis-
crimination, the court under the EEOA will look for patterns of 
state discrimination unsupported by compelling state interests. 
This standard will affect how the court reviews the legislative 
record. 
C. Legislative Record 
The EEOA legislative record must affirmatively identify in-
stances of conduct by a state that violates the constitution. 81 
The Garrett decision established that the Court will give Con-
gress very little deference and will initiate a strict, skeptical 
review of the legislative record. 82 In section 1702 of the EEOA, 
Congress explains its findings: 
The congress finds that-
1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which stu-
dents are assigned to schools solely on the basis of race, 
color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the 
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth 
amendment 
2) for the purpose of abolishing dual school systems and 
eliminating the vestiges thereof, many local educational 
agencies have been required to reorganize their school sys-
tems, to reassign students, and to engage in the extensive 
transportation of students; 
3) the implementation of desegregation plans that re-
quire extensive student transportation has, in many cases, 
required local educational agencies to expend large amount 
of funds, thereby depleting their financial resources avail-
79. See Moran, supra n. 15, at :3:31. 
80. Chemerinsky supra n. 2, at 18; see also Thro, supra, n. 42, at 501. 
ill. Garrell, 5:!1 U.S. ai :l70. 
82. Buzbee, supru n. 47, at 118. 
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able for the maintenance or improvement of the quality of 
educational facilities and instruction provided; 
4) transportc.tion of students which creates serious risks 
to their health and safety, disrupts the educational process 
carried out with respect to such students, and impinges 
significantly on their education opportunity, is excessive; 
5) the risks and harms created by excessive transporta-
tion are particularly great for children enrolled in the first 
six grades; and 
6) the guidelines provided by the courts for fashioning 
remedies to dismantle dual schools systems have been, as 
the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "incom-
plete and imperfect," and have not established, a clear, ra-
tional, and uniform standard of determining the extent to 
which a local educational agency is required to reassign and 
transport its students in order to eliminate the vestiges of a 
83 dual school system. 
A private party bringing suit against a state for a bilingual 
educational program will have immediate trouble under the 
Garrett analysis because the codified legislative findings make 
no mention of specific state violations. 84 The Garrett court 
pointed out that the "States alone employed some four and one 
half million people. It is telling ... that Congress assembled 
only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimi-
nation in employment against the disabled."85 Garrett and its 
predecessors require that the EEOA findings focus on continu-
ous constitutional violations by state actors that the EEOA 
would actually prevent. 86 If the congressional findings support-
ing the EEOA fail to demonstrate instances of state actions 
that violate the constitution, the EEOA is impermissible posi-
tive legislation, as opposed to permissible remedial legislation, 
which does not constitute a valid abrogation of the state's sov-
ereign immunity. 
The Garrett Court specified that it would not consider in-
stances of discrimination from municipal entities when consid-
ering the legislative record. Included in the municipal classifi-
cation are school boards and school districts. 87 Because the 
83. 20 U .:S.C. § 1702. 
84. /d. 
85. Garrett, 531 U.S. at ~370. 
86. See Leonard, supra n. 31, at 13:i. 
87. Rottmda, supra n. 19, at§ 12.2, 156. 
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EEOA is based on discrimination in educational institutions, 
the legislative record will likely cite many instances of classifi-
cation with schools, school districts, and decisions by school 
boards. As the Court in Garrett stated in regard to the ADA: 
These [units oflocal government] are subject to private claims 
for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to 
rely on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to render them so. 
It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations 
on their par, as well as by the States themselves, when on!¥ 
the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment. 
In reality, without specific instances of constitutional dis-
crimination beyond the schools and school districts, the court 
will not likely hold that Congress had reason to enact the 
EEOA against the states.89 
Moreover, the EEOA was enacted in 1974, long before the 
recent revolution in constitutional law. Congress had no way of 
foreseeing the strict scrutiny the Supreme Court would place 
on the legislative record. Therefore, the legislative record will 
not likely support the pattern of specific instances of discrimi-
nation by state actors, which the Rehnquist court now requires 
before abrogating state immunity. 90 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under the Garrett standard, the EEOA will fail to abrogate 
states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for the fol-
lowing reasons. 
1) The EEOA does not specifically abrogate the states' sov-
ereign immunity by making a clear, unequivocal statement 
that it does so within the act itself. This problem could be eas-
ily remedied by a congressional amendment to the act indicat-
ing clear congressional intent to abrogate the state's right to 
immunity. The ADA contains language that could appropri-
ately be added to the EEOA: "A state shall not be immune un-
der the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
88. Garrett, 531 U.S. at ;{69. One should note, however, that "school districts may 
or may not be directly affected by Garrett depending upon their status tmder state law. 
Districts that enjoy their states' l~leventh Amendmcmt immtmity, a question decided by 
state law, would no longer be subject to damage claims under the ADA." Borkowski, 
supra n. 20, at 3~>4 .. 
89. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367. 
~JO. Leonard, supra n. 31, at 130. 
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States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent 
jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter."91 
2) The remedies mandated by the EEOA do not apply to vio-
lations of the Fourteenth Amendment directly because they do 
not require a discriminatory intent. If a cause of action is 
brought under the EEOA that alleges a withholding of educa-
tional rights without discriminatory intent, the remedy is be-
yond the Section Five powers of Congress and will not likely 
pass the congruency and proportionality test. A plaintiff can 
argue, however, that his or her state right (dependent on state 
law) to education is property that is being taken without due 
process of law. Under that rationale, the EEOA could be used 
to successfully bring an action against a state if the language 
barriers do, in fact, prevent the student from receiving an ap-
propriate education. However, given the Court's recent defer-
ence to the states' broad latitude to prescribe appropriate ac-
tion to overcome language barriers, a due process claim will be 
difficult to sustain. 
3) The EEOA congressional findings will not sufficiently 
demonstrate a continuing pattern of unconstitutional state ac-
tion unattached to a compelling state purpose. Without a pur-
pose for enacting the EEOA, the legislation becomes positive 
legislation as opposed to a remedy, and is, therefore, an invalid 
congressional exercise of power beyond its §5 powers. Part of 
the problem is that the EEOA was "enacted mainly out of con-
cern about the wide-spread use of busing as a remedy for past 
segregation in the schools. Special [language] education pro-
grams ... were simply an example of the kind of quality educa-
tion programs might be substituted for unpopular busing 
remedies."92 Consequently, the chance that Congress gathered 
the breadth of data that the Garrett court would require is 
unlikely. 
Because bilingual education is a battle that will continue 
for years, eventually moving to the federal level, litigation un-
der the EEOA will likely climb into the forefront of education 
law. Whether or not Garrett was correctly decided, the Court 
clearly indicated that the immediate future holds expanded 
sovereign immunity for states and a higher level of scrutiny for 
federal acts such as the EEOA. If litigated under the right cir-
91. ~2 U.S.C. §12202. 
92. Moran, supra n. 15, at :J:i9. 
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cumstances, plaintiffs may be unable to prove congressional in-
tent to abrogating state immunity, leaving those plaintiffs 
without a claim and Congress with another worthless act on its 
hands. 
Geoffrey Landward 
